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THE INTEGRITY OF LAW
IDA'S WAY: CONSTRUCTING THE RESPECTWORTHY GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM
Frank L Michelman*
This is for Dean John Feerick. It is about him, too, in a way,
although it may not appear to be. It is about character, civility, and
good will. It is about what is required of a group of people, and their
leaders, who find themselves, for very good and strong reasons, in a
certain situation of the greatest interest to political thought:
determined to stick together, but to do so in ways and under
conditions that all know will require each to submit himself or herself
to an endless series of binding, collective decisions, affecting matters
dear to the hearts of many or of all, about which they expect to be
divided by profound, intractable disagreements.
I am not presuming to suggest that such has recently been the case
of the Fordham University School of Law or its faculty. (Who would I
be to know?) It can, of course, be thus with faculties; but facultiesmuch as I cherish them-are not my main concern in what follows.
Rather, I have in mind the situation of members of a modern political
society, seen as a great deal of contemporary political philosophy has
been inclined to see it. Liberal theory lately has given a lot of
attention to the existence of such disagreement as I have mentioned,
and to the question of how, in view of "this fact of pluralism," the
coercion implicit in any possible practice of legal ordering, or
government by law, can possibly be morally appropriate.1
I. "INTEGRITY" IN A

NEW KEY

A. Goods of Union
Suppose you believed all of the following-never mind right now
why you might; we'll get to that.2 First: A law (a legal rule, principle,
* Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University. I am indebted to
Jeremy Waldron for a crucial suggestion.
1. See, e.g., John Rawls, Political Liberalism 36-37 (1996) (positing "general
facts" of "reasonable pluralism" and of "oppression"); id. at 217 (proposing a "liberal
principle of legitimacy").
2. See infra Part II.
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or norm) can be validly "in force" in a country regardless of whether
that law is witless, vicious, unjust, or all of the above. (So it does not
seem to you, as it did to St. Augustine, that an unjust law is "no law at
all."3 ) Second, in some countries-though not all-governments are
morally justified in demanding everyone's compliance with all the laws
that the judges in that country treat as validly in force, regardless of
the moral and other merits and demerits of any given law. Third,
inhabitants of such countries can be morally justified in collaborating
with the government's efforts to secure such compliance, using
coercive means if necessary, regardless of any adverse convictions that
they, themselves, may hold regarding the merits of any law. Fourth, it
is very much in the moral and other interests of everyone in a given
country that the second and third propositions in this series should
hold true there. Countries in which those two propositions do hold
true are morally and otherwise well-ordered in a way that other
countries are not.
Here, in a nutshell, is why: Only where the propositions do hold
true (so runs the set of beliefs we are positing) can inhabitants partake
of certain great "goods of the political"4 or-as I sometimes shall call
them-goods of "union." This result is owing, in part, to what John
Rawls, himself approving it, called "Hobbes' thesis."' Without the
government's known and proven readiness to step in as necessary to
make sure that everyone plays by the rules, the country's practice of
legal ordering, or government by law, by which the goods of union are
produced, could not be expected to hold together. On the other hand,
though, it will not serve our moral interests to have those goods of
union produced by morally reprehensible means. In order, then, for
our moral interests to be served, it would have to be the case that the
second and third propositions in this series hold true.
Fifth, whether those two propositions (the second and third of the
series) hold true in any given country depends on the general system
of government and lawmaking in place in that country. They do if,
and only if, that country's general system of government is in certain
crucial respects reliable or, as I shall say, "respect-worthy." It follows,
if the fourth proposition in the series has been accepted, that everyone
has a very strong reason for wishing the system of government in his
or her country to be, in the relevant sense, respect-worthy.
Summarizing in reverse, the set of beliefs we are positing comes to
this: On condition that a country's system of government is respect3. See St. Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica, Part One of the Second
Part, Question 95: Of Human Law, Second Article, Objection 4, reprinted in George
C. Christie & Patrick H. Martin, Jurisprudence: Text and Readings on the Philosophy
of Law 166 (2d ed. 1995) (reporting and endorsing St. Augustine's remark).
4. See Rawls, supra note 1, at 139, 157 (discussing "the very great public good" of
the political).
5. Id. at 211.
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worthy (in a certain sense still to be developed), inhabitants are
morally justified in collaborating in universal networks of compulsion
to comply with all the legal products of that system. Being thus
justified is very much in the moral interest of the inhabitants, because
only on the condition of (more or less) everyone's guaranteed
compliance (most of the time) with all of the laws can inhabitants
secure to themselves and their fellows a package of very great moral
goods of political union, through their practice of legal ordering or
government by law.
Of course, you don't have to believe any of it. But suppose you did.
B. The "Governmental Totality"

Suppose you believe it all. In order, then, to tell whether you have
the valued moral warrant for collaboration in your country's networks
of legal compulsion, you will have to pass judgment on the respectworthiness of your country's general system of government currently
in place. In order to do that, you must be able to see and to say what
that system is. How, then, will you go about constructing your image
of what "the system" is?
At this point, I am going to suggest one possible way of doing it.
Possible alternatives will appear later.6 You could start with the
obvious idea that the "system" or "practice" of government whose
respect-worthiness you want to gauge consists of the entire aggregate
of concrete political and legal institutions, practices, laws, and legal
interpretations currently in force or occurrent in the country. Call this
"the governmental totality." It would be, in effect, the currently
surviving deposit of the country's entire history to date of institutional
and legal creation and revision. Notice that, if your country happens
to be one that relies substantially on judicial rulings to steer or
constrain decisions on matters of substance -such as the permissibility
of abortion, the use of affirmative action measures, the
implementation of the death penalty, the legal regulation of the flow
of money in politics, the use of the public budget to provide direct
support for sectarian religious education, the obligations of the
government to provide positively for people's basic civic needs,
interests, and opportunities, etc.-then (but only then) the current
governmental totality will be composed, in significant part, of major,
extant judicial rulings on such matters.
Looking out at this governmental totality, one might ask oneself
how various classes or groups of persons are faring, and maybe how
they would perceive matters from their own situations and
standpoints. One would apply whatever standards of freedom, justice,
prosperity, distribution, participation, and systemic openness to
change one considers to be applicable. Finally, one would judge
6. See infra Part III.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

whether the total performance is good enough, on the whole, to be
accepted considering the practical, imaginable alternatives. If one
judged that it would be, say, foolhardy to answer this question with a
"no," then, keeping Hobbes' thesis in mind, one might judge the
governmental totality to be respect-worthy. Consequently, everyone
would be justified in collaborating in the country's networks of
inducement and, where needed, compulsion, of universal compliance
with every law that issues from the system.
C. "Integration"("Rational Reconstruction")7
It seems that a person attempting to gauge the respect-worthiness
of her county's extant system of government in this total-performance
way will have to proceed in a manner rather like that of Ronald
Dworkin's legendary Judge Hercules.'
To keep this non-official
personage distinct from Hercules the judge, I'll call her Ida. On any
given occasion, Ida, like Hercules, is aiming to make a judgment.
Perhaps in the wake of some repellent governmental action or legal
outcome from the system of government in place in her country, Ida
feels called upon to say whether that system continues to be one that
she judges respect-worthy-worth preserving-even at the cost of
supporting enforcement of bad and wrong laws issuing from it. Such a
judgment, regarding the moral merit of the system, requires that Ida
have in view a more refined specification of what the system is than
she can get from just staring at the total, aggregate mass of raw,
undigested, political and legal data found in the national annals and
archives. Ida will have to connect the dots into normative patterns
and principles. She will have to extrapolate some major, implicit
normative leanings and trend-lines. She will have to make some kind
of start, at least, toward cooking the raw data into an incipient,
normative political theory.
It thus appears that Ida's problem resembles Hercules'. Like him,
she must refine her country's raw, historical record of lawmaking and
related events into a more or less clear picture of what she then
(having produced the picture) will consider the country's central,
defining, political-moral commitments.
It is those defining
commitments, thus depicted, that will compose the "system" that Ida
will find to be, or not to be, sufficiently worth preserving to warrant
support of every law that issues from it (in view of Hobbes' thesis),
7. See, e.g., Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms 59 (W. Rehg trans.,
1996) (using the term "rational reconstruction" to signify an "articulation" of "the
normative substance of the most trustworthy intuitions of our everyday political
practice, as well as the substance of the best traditions of our political culture"); id. at
197, 211, 222 (using the same term to describe Ronald Dworkin's account of
adjudicative work).
8. See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, in Taking Rights Seriously 81, 105-30
(1977); see also Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire passim (1986).
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regardless of moral or other faults in any of those laws taken on their
own. It seems that the only way by which Ida can hope to draw such a
systemic picture, from what starts out as a byte-by-byte record of the
country's legal and governmental history, is the one Hercules uses:
Treat the record as if it were made by an acting subject that has, or
has been developing, a consistent set of political-moral intentions, as a
person of integrity would.
Nor does the parallel with Hercules, J., end there. Just as Hercules
is destined to do, so is Ida bound to sense or perceive more than one
plausible construction of the performance history to date. These
could include at least one construction she regards as projecting a
governmental practice that is respect-worthy or worth preserving and
at least one she does not. Perhaps Ida, like Hercules, will operate on
the premise that the "correct" construction is the one that reflects
what she finds to be the most morally redemptive set of basic
principles that "fits" the data about as well as any morally inferior
competing construction does. If so, then she, like Hercules, will be
brushing aside a certain fraction of inimical judicial rulings and other
pieces of the totality as "mistakes" that she, optimistically, allows
herself to expect will give way to correction, if not tomorrow then in
the not-too-distant future.
For an especially clear and dramatic illustration, consider an
American Ida in 1857, newly confronted with the Supreme Court's
decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford.9 In that case, the Court declared
its view that "the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly
affirmed in the Constitution."1 It held that slavery, therefore, could
not be prevented by federal law from spreading into the pre-statehood
territories of the United States without contravening the Fifth
Amendment's guarantee against deprivations of property without due
process of law. Coming in the wake of earlier, ostensibly pro-slavery
decisions,12 the Dred Scott ruling struck many free-soil advocates (or
so they claimed) as reflecting a construction of the American Union
that foretold future Supreme Court rulings protecting slave-holding
against exclusion or suppression by state law, even in the historically

9. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
10. Id. at 451.
11. See id. at 449-50.
12. See Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1850) (holding that states are
free without federal supervision to fashion their own laws for determining the slave or
free status of any person); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 611, 612-13
(1842) (holding state laws unconstitutional-as violations of a power vested
exclusively in Congress to regulate in the matter of fugitive slaves-insofar as they
might "interrupt[], limit[], delay[], or postpone[] the right of an the owner to the
immediate possession of a the slave," and describing the Constitution's fugitive slave
clause as a guarantee of security of property so vital to Southern "interests and
institutions" that it must be deemed "a fundamental article, without the adoption of
which the Union could not have been formed").
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"free" states.13 If our Ida had shared that apprehension, and if she
had considered slavery to be a moral evil great enough to outweigh

the moral and other goods of union, she might have decided, as many
Garrisonians claimed they did, that this Union was not worth saving
and hence not deserving of her continued collaboration.14

That would not have been, however, the only path open to her
thinking. Alternatively, our Ida could have believed sincerely that the

Supreme Court had misconstrued the American Union as one that
affirmatively condones the institution of slavery and contemplates its
perpetuity in the United States. Along with Frederick Douglass and
Abraham Lincoln, she could have believed that the Union, on a true

construction, was one that temporized with slavery, to be sure, for the
sake of union-creation, but that also was from the beginning designed

by its framers to set slavery "in the course of ultimate extinction."15 So
believing, Ida could have concluded honorably that the Union, partly
for that very reason, was worth preserving.16 She, then, would have
followed Lincoln in treating the Dred Scott decision as a "mistake," a
presumably barren and doomed judicial act that did not, as such,

reflect much on the respect-worthiness of the true American system of
government; and thus was not to be granted any "gravitational" effect
on other cases claimed to fall within its normative neighborhood, 7
although also was-and this would be Ida's bow to Hobbes' thesis-

not to be denied validity as an act of government demanding to be
heeded as such. Ida, then, would have counseled against any direct
13. See, e.g., Abraham Lincoln, A House Divided: Speech at Springfield, Illinois
(June 16, 1858), in 2 Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 461, 464-65 (Roy P. Basler
ed., 1953); Abraham Lincoln, First Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Ottawa,
Illinois, (Aug, 21, 1858), in 3 Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, supra, at 27. It is
not fully clear exactly how the Supreme Court was expected to hinge such a ruling to
the constitutional text. The Fifth Amendment itself had no application to state
lawmaking. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 247 (1833). It seems the likeliest textual
hook would have been the Article IV, Section 2, Privileges and Immunities Clause of
the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860), where the
New York court rejected a plausible-looking claim to the effect that New York could
not, consistently with this clause, strip a slave-owner of his slave property by applying
its law of personal freedom to slaves being shipped through the port of New York
from one slave jurisdiction to another.
14. See Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the
Republican Party Before the Civil War 137-38 (1995). William Lloyd Garrison
famously called the "compact... between the North and the South" a "covenant with
death and an agreement with hell." Resolution Adopted by the Antislavery Society,
Jan. 27, 1843, quoted in Walter M. Merrill, Against Wind and Tide: A Biography of
Wm.Lloyd Garrison 205 (1963).
15. E.g., Abraham Lincoln, Reply at the Debate in Jonesboro, Illinois (Sept. 15,
1857), in 3 Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 117 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953); see
also Frederick Douglass, The Constitution of the United States: Is It Pro-Slavery or
Anti-Slavery?, in 2 Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass 467 (Philip S. Foner ed.,
1950).
16. But see Frederick Douglass, Autobiographies 704-05 (1994).
17. Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 8, at 111.
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interference with the specific civil relationship decreed by the Court
to subsist between Dred Scott and John Sanford. 8
Having noticed how Ida's intellectual problem resembles that of

Hercules, J., we ought also to notice how her role and situation differ
from his. Unlike Hercules, Ida is not a public official responsible for
specific exercises of power over other individuals and the affairs that
concern them. If Herc, and Herc2, each sitting as a judge in his own

court, disagree over the true construction of the system at the same
moment in time-or if, ostensibly agreeing on the true construction,
they nevertheless disagree over what it requires in identical cases
pending before them-there is an apparent problem of justice. The
fates of the litigants then hang on which judge's court they happen to
land in. Of course, there is an appeals system designed, in part, to
handle this sort of problem. Yet if both cases travel up the appellate
pyramid, the outcomes then will hinge on a nose-count among three,

seven, or nine SuperHercs whose several internal moral vectors may
happen to diverge in respects material to this particular case.
Whether these quirks present a serious moral problem is not a
question on which we need to dwell; they have no application to our
heroines.
No doubt, various Idas may arrive at various

reconstructions of the governmental system in place, owing to
differences in their internal moral compasses. 9 That effect, however,
can pose no direct problem of justice to parties because no Ida
directly exercises any power over any party. Whether the effect poses

some other sort of political-moral problem is a question better left
until later.
2°
II. LIBERAL LEGITIMACY: A BRIEF GENEALOGY

A. Liberalismand the Pull to Consensus

I want now to expand on the reasons why anyone actually might
18. Ida would still be tracking Lincoln. See Abraham Lincoln, Speech at
Springfield, Illinois (June 26, 1857), in 2 Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 400-03
(Roy P. Basler ed., 1953); cf. Abraham Lincoln, Address Before the Young Men's
Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois (Jan. 27, 1838), in 1 Collected Works of Abraham
Lincoln, supra, at 112-13.
19. See infra Part III.C.
20. Part II of this Article deals in abbreviated form with matters I have discussed
in several other recent writings and draws substantially from them. See Frank I.
Michelman, The Problem of Constitutional Interpretive Disagreement, in Habermas
and Pragmatism (Mitchell Aboulafia et al. eds., 2002); Frank I. Michelman,
Constitutional Legitimation For Political Acts, 66 Mod. L. Rev. 1 (2003); Frank I.
Michelman, Is the Constitution a Contract For Legitimacy?, 8 Rev. of Const. Stud.
(forthcoming 2003); Frank I. Michelman, Living With Judicial Supremacy, 38 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 579 (2003); Frank I. Michelman, Postmodernism, Proceduralism,and
ConstitutionalJustice: A Comment on van der Walt and Botha, 9 Constellations 246
(2002); Frank I. Michelman, Relative Constraint and Public Reason: What is "The
Work We Expect of Law"?, 67 Brook. L. Rev. 963 (2002).
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believe the series of five propositions with which we launched this
reflection. 2' And I want to do so by putting a "'political liberal" spin
on the series of beliefs.
"Liberals," as I use the term, are those of us who insist on the
recognition by persons of each other as "free and equal. 2 2 We insist
on acceptance of the equal claim of each person to the pursuit of a life
in accord with aims and ideals she adopts for herself, and on respect
for each person's capacity for such a pursuit.2 ' Liberals, accordingly,
are committed to a sympathetic regard for the wide and deep diversity
of ethical outlooks, situations, and interests among inhabitants of a
modern country. Understanding that this ethical diversity gives rise to
frequent, sincere, and intractable disagreements over what the laws
for a society of notionally free and equal persons ought in all reason
and justice to provide, liberals share a sense of moral obligation to
take political disagreement seriously, respect it, and try to work
around it.
"Political" liberals of this kind-I use John Rawls' name for usshy away from coercion, of ourselves or of others. We want to feel
that we always, when called upon, can give to others "public" reasons
sufficient to justify the actual processes and practices of legal coercion
in which we connive. Very roughly, public reasons are reasons that
the giver sincerely believes ought to count as such for any rightminded (a/k/a "reasonable") political associate.2 4 In other words,
political liberalism is, itself, a kind of fighting faith. For better or for
worse, political liberals feel morally justified in restricting the circle of
those to whom we feel bound to justify our practice of political
coercion to those who are "reasonable" like us. But what is
"reasonable?"
B. Legal Orderingand "Hobbes' Thesis"
I assume most readers take for granted that the possibility of legal
ordering-or call it government by law-is a very good thing, morally.
A social practice of government by law, we feel certain-at least
assuming it is popularly based and is otherwise "decent" 2 5-can carry
inestimable benefits, for everyone affected, of social pacification,
cooperation, coordination, and justice.
The taken-for-granted
supposition, to be clear, is not that any current governmental or legal
order cannot stand vast improvement from the standpoints of justice,
morality, and efficiency. Much more modestly, it is that our current
21. See supra Part I.A.
22. E.g., Rawls, supra note 1, at 19,217.
23. Liberal individualism of this stripe is not to be confused with "atomism." See,
e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Brennan and Democracy 65-67 (1999).
24. See generally John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in John Rawls:
Collected Papers 573 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
25. See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 62-68 (1999).
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governmental order, and others relevantly resembling it, bring to
everyone involved those mentioned, inestimable goods of the
political,2 6 when the baseline for comparison is a world without
government by law. We are all, to that extent, the children of Thomas
Hobbes and-as Jeremy Waldron would want me to add-Immanuel
Kant.2 7
We easily think of these great goods of the political as moral goods,
on the understanding that everyone shares in the increase to them that
results from any decent practice of government by law. 28 This
expected flow of universal benefit can provide a strong, moral
motivation for the support of such practices. It also offers moral
justification for mobilization of social pressure and public force as
required to ensure compliance by all with each and every law that
29
issues from a currently established governmental system.
The reason why lies, of course, in "Hobbes' thesis."30 The thesis
starts from a sense that no practice of government by law can succeed
in delivering its vaunted moral goods without the persistence in
society of widespread inclinations to comply voluntarily with the laws
(and legal interpretations) that issue from the practice.3 ' Next comes
a belief that such inclinations cannot persist without an experientially
justified expectation on the part of each participant that the othersmost of them, most of the time-will play by the rules; that is, they
will more or less abide by all the laws that issue from the specific
regime of legal government that currently is established in the
country, not picking and choosing which ones they'll respect and
which they'll trash. We lack confidence that such expectations can
hold up without visible guarantees of institutional backup. We fear
the system will unravel without support from a credible prospect of
socially organized compulsion waiting in the wings for cases of willful
non-compliance.32
All of this probably will make good sense to most readers. But
consider, then, the consequence when you add to the picture the kind
of deep, intractable, normative disagreement that recent liberal theory
26. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
27. See Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation 36-62 (1999); Immanuel
Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice § 42 (John Ladd trans., 1999); Thomas
Hobbes, Leviathan chs. 13-17 (M. Oakeshott ed., 1962) (1651).
28. It would be going too far to suggest that any world in which government by
law prevails must be better for everyone in it, or rank higher on the scale of what is
right and fair, than might any realistically conceivable world from which this condition
is absent. We do mostly take for granted, though, that the claim holds true of many
historical and contemporary instances of the genus, including our own today.
29. We can leave room for contained occasions of civil disobedience and
conscientious refusal without much disturbing the argument. See generally John
Rawls, A Theory of Justice 319-43 (rev. ed. 1999).
30. See supra note 5.
31. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 191 (2d ed. 1994).
32. See, e.g., Habermas, supra note 7, at 8, 28, 198 (1996).
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posits as endemic in modern political societies. To speak, as John
Rawls does, of a plurality of clashing "comprehensive" ethical and
metaphysical "views" is not quite fully to describe our predicament.
Owing in part to what Rawls calls "burdens of judgment,"33 our
reasonable clashes of "view" extend to any number of major and
morally fraught public policy choices that have to be resolved in one
and only one way for everyone-e.g., under what, if any, conditions
may or shall the state punish abortion, or compel taxpayer support of
religious schools?34

The consequence, then, of our attachments to

government by law and to Hobbes' thesis is that we all become
collaborators in webs of social practices that exert coercion and
pressure upon persons to uphold and comply with laws that they know
in their hearts to be bad, wrong, and unjust.
Do not doubt it. Day in, day out, by countless large and small acts
of compliance and collaboration with our country's governmental
regime, we, with little compunction, involve ourselves in a social
mobilization of pressure and force against persons to comply with
sundry laws and other legal acts with which they do not agree. And
not only acts with which they do not agree, but acts that they
confidently judge to be quite bad and wrong, and from what they
sincerely and credibly take to be a public and not just a selfish point of
view. Since judgments of the public merits of legal acts rarely will be
unanimous, and disagreements about this often will be not only
intractable and sharp but also honest and reasonable on all sides-or
so we liberals insist-we may as well say that the benign and urgent
aims of government by law require our willingness to join in
subjecting others (not to mention ourselves) to pressures and
compulsions to abide by legal acts that, so far as they (or we) honestly
can tell, simply are wrong, are destructive or unjust, objectively and
not just according to their (or our) own personal assessments.35
Liberals cannot find this a comfortable state of affairs.
33. "Burdens of judgment" encompass sundry causes of obdurate disagreement
about justice among reasonable persons who observe and report honestly, argue
cogently, and share "a desire to honor fair terms of cooperation." Rawls, supra note
1, at 54-58. Among these causes Rawls lists the likelihood that
the way we assess evidence and weigh moral and political values is shaped by
our total experience, our whole course of life up to now; and our total
experiences must always differ. Thus, in a modern society with its numerous
offices and positions, its various divisions of labor, its many social groups
and their ethnic variety, citizens' total experiences are disparate enough for
their judgments to diverge, at least to some degree, on many if not most
cases of any significant complexity.
Id. at 56-57.
34. Compare id. at 36-37 (describing a "reasonable pluralism" of comprehensive
ethical and philosophical views) with Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement 10506, 112-13, 152, 158-59 (1999) (pointing out the inevitable resulting persistence of
reasonable disagreement over the demands of justice regarding matters of public
policy, including at the constitutional level).
35. Note that the claim here is not that there are no right answers to questions of
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C. The "Reasonable"

We are now in a position to say a little more, at least, about the
circle of "reasonable" political associates to whom political liberals
feel bound to justify their collaboration in legal coercion, in terms that
will count as "public" within that circle.36 Suppose everyone felt
perfectly free to refuse compliance with any law reflecting or
supporting a public policy that deviates sharply from the dictates of
his or her own moral convictions. Alternatively, suppose we took it as
granted that each political associate, as "free and equal," has a
morally justified complaint against the state's general demand for
compliance with any law that so deviates. In the first instance,
assuming the correctness of Hobbes' thesis, no practice of government
by law could be sustained at all in an ethically diverse society. In the
second instance, none could justifiably be sustained among an
ethically diverse population of persons who also are liberally
committed to recognize and respect one another as free and equal. In
either instance, the very great goods of the political would be
unattainable in any liberal society where the fact of reasonable
pluralism obtained. "Reasonable" political associates, it may now be
said, are limited to those who are moved by these perceptions of
impossibility to reject the assumption that anyone is free to refuse
compliance with laws that don't conform to the dictates of his or her
considered moral convictions, and that anyone has a justified
complaint against state enforcement of any law that does not so
conform. "Reasonable" associates include only those who share the
same resulting liberal spirit of reciprocity37 and forbearance that
motivates "us." John Rawls calls it "civility.
D. "Proceduralism"

Even within the circle of the reasonable thus defined, we must
expect protracted and contentious disagreements over major, morally
fraught issues of public policy. If only owing to burdens of judgment,38
reasonable people in ethically diverse societies disagree sharply,
deeply, and obdurately over the moral and other practical merits of
policies regarding such matters as affirmative action, abortion, school
vouchers, public religious exercises, restriction of money in politics,
and the death penalty, to name a few. Is political liberalism, then, a
project beyond reach?

political justice and prudence. The problem is that there are no publicly established
answers to many of these questions, and aren't likely to be, in real political time, as
long as "reasonable pluralism" is true of our countries.
36. See supra Part II.A.
37. Rawls, supra note 24, at 576.
38. See supra notes 33-34.
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Enter the "procedural" turn in contemporary liberal theories of
political justification. John Rawls provides a leading example in his
proposed "liberal principle of legitimacy."
"[O]ur exercise of
[coercive] political power," that principle runs, "is proper and hence
justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution
the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to
endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as
reasonable and rational."3 9
For Rawls, the category of "constitutional essentials" includes
guarantees regarding the substance of the law, not just the
institutional and procedural protocols for making it.4" In what sense,
then, can it be said that Rawls proposes a "procedural" test for
political justification? "Procedural," in this context, does not mean a
test concerned only with matters of lawmaking process as
distinguished from the content of the legal product. It rather means a
test that is abstracted or deflected from issues of morality and public
policy that are obdurately and divisively controversial in society.
People who can't just go their separate ways, or don't want to, and
who also can't agree on what really ought to be done by or for all of
them together, may sometimes be able to find agreement on a method
for settling what actually is to be done next. If several friends find
themselves quarreling over which movie to see tonight but are
determined to stick together in any case, maybe they can agree to
"bracket" their quarrel by a coin flip. If members of society find they
can't, in real political time, agree on the morality or utility of a
government-dictated wages policy, maybe they still can agree to let
the matter be resolved from time to time by laws made according to
the rules laid down in a constitution. Their agreed practice for pro
tempore legal settlement then is the "procedure," and the on-going,
unresolved, bracketed disagreement of morality or policy is the
"substance." Proceduralism thus implies a resort to what we may,
with apologies to Rawls, call a "method of avoidance."41
As should now be clear, some matters that undoubtedly would be
classed as "substantive" in other contexts play a "proceduralizing"
role in Rawls' liberal principle of legitimacy. The thought is that
reasonable people can all agree to the moral authority of a certain
constitutional system for resolving all the (other) politically decidable
39. Rawls, supra note 1, at 217.
40. See id. at 227 (including among "constitutional essentials" the "equal basic
rights and liberties of citizenship that legislative majorities are to respect: such as the
right to vote and to participate in politics, liberty of conscience, freedom of thought
and of association, as well as the protections of the rule of law").
41. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness:Politicalnot Metaphysical, in Rawls: Collected
Papers 388, 395 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999) ("The hope is that.., this method of
avoidance ... may enable us to conceive how, given a desire for free and uncoerced
agreement, a public understanding could arise consistent with the historical conditions
and constraints of our social world.").

2003]

IDA'S WAY

questions that might come before the country from time to time, but
only if that system includes guarantees against infringement of certain
interests or rights that undoubtedly are substantive in ordinary
thought: freedom from enslavement, for example, or freedom of
thought and conscience, or an aptly qualified right to hold property.42
In other words, a constitutional bill of "substantive" rights can be
understood as the product of a "proceduralist" impulse to deflect
attention from those politically decidable questions on which
members of society cannot reasonably be expected or called upon to
agree to a set of more abstract rules and principles defining a general
political system for producing pro tempore institutional settlements of
contested issues of public policy. On this set of rules and principles
(or political system), all reasonable participants should find they have
sufficient reason to agree. To put the idea a bit crudely: Reasonable
people, aware of those inestimable benefits of government by law we
keep harping on, and sharing a belief in Hobbes' thesis, can agree to
take their chances on a recognizably democratic governmental system
whose performance is guaranteed to stay within the constraints of a
good, liberal, constitutional bill of rights.
If so, then it seems it should be possible to sustain a practice of
government by law among an ethically diverse society of free and
equal, reasonable and rational persons-including insistence, if that
be thought necessary, on conformance by everyone to all the laws that
issue from the system. All one needs is the right kind of constitution,
one suited to the work that the legitimation project-so to name itcalls for. If the constitution is one that no reasonable person can
reject as unworthy of the kind of respect that the project calls for, and
if unconstitutional laws are more or less guaranteed to get sooner or
later knocked out, then (it follows trivially) no reasonable person can
complain about the state's demand for everyone's support of all the
laws that make it through the constitutional-legal screen.
E. "Legitimacy"
And so we reach the notion of a "legitimate" law. A legitimate law
is not necessarily a commendable one, nor even necessarily one that is
consonant with justice. A law is legitimate, in your eyes, if you believe
the state is, so to speak, within its rights in enforcing that law against
you and everyone -regardless of whether you also believe that law,
taken on its own merits, to be quite awful. Such a notion, obviously,
will be at home only in the mind of a person who, being reasonable (in
our special sense of the term),43 is able to see how the state can be
acting in a morally proper way when it seeks to enforce, against all
alike, all the laws that issue duly from the governmental system
42. See Rawls, supra note 1, at 291, 298.
43. See supra Part II.C.
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currently in force, notwithstanding the undoubted fact that always
among those laws will be some that some inhabitants, sincerely and

very possibly correctly, condemn as bad and wrong. The core of a
"legitimacy" plea thus consists of two propositions: first, that our
country's total, extant system of government by law is morally worth
preserving (and here we would always implicitly be adding,
considering the realistically available alternatives); and, second

("Hobbes' thesis"), that preserving it requires recognition all-round
that the state is, so to speak, within its rights enforcing every law that
issues from the system, including even some very bad and immoral
ones.
Such a notion of legal legitimacy, if it can be sustained, plainly is

one of very high moral import. The point of it, after all, is to justify
morally what otherwise would appear to be unjustifiable to any

liberal; that is, participation in compulsion against others to abide by
laws that they know, as may we, to be bad and wrong.
III. SOME VARIATIONS ON SYSTEM CONSTRUCTION
A. The System as Majority Rule
Suppose you accept all that has preceded. Belief in the great goods

of government by law, along with Hobbes' thesis, provides the major
premise for what we may call a legitimation project, meaning a
possible justification of collaboration in the enforcement of all lawsright or wrong, good or bad-issuing from a governmental system in
place. The respect-worthiness of the governmental system in place

supplies a requisite minor premise for the project. The major premise
is fixed, but the minor premise is variable; that is, its truth depends on

a judgment one makes regarding the respect-worthiness of the
particular governmental system currently in place. 44
How ought we conceive of the
Then comes the question:
"governmental system in place," the claimed moral desirability of

preserving which supplies a needed premise for general political
justification? By what mental and discursive processes might we most
44. By speaking of the system as being "in place," I do not mean to suggest it must
be conceived as closed to change. The system may be conceived to include devices
for change, or avenues to change, and these may be among its most normatively
significant features. All that is signified by "in place" is that anyone trying to gauge
the moral adequacy of the system to render legitimate the governmental acts that
issue from it will have to be able to say what the system is. If his account of it is going
to include its built-in devices for change, or avenues to change, he will have to be able
to say what they are. If they are plastic, uncertain, or in flux-as we well may have
reason to wish them to be-he still will have to be able to say something, at least,
about what the devices/avenues for resolving them are. And so on. See Frank I.
Michelman, Human Rights and the Limits of ConstitutionalTheory, 13 Ratio Juris 63
(2000); Frank I. Michelman, "Protectingthe People from Themselves," or How Direct
Can Democracy Be?, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1717, 1728-30, 1733-34 (1998).
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aptly construct our images of what "the system" is in order to gauge
its respect-worthiness as a system?
Jeremy Waldron presents possibilities for what we may callcomparing it with John Rawls' proposal" 5-a radically proceduralized
theory of "the governmental system in place."46 Perhaps it is possible
for political associates at any time to agree on whether lawmaking and
related public-policy choices are or are not being accomplished by
means that are consistent with the principle of majority rule, including
being open to revision by majoritarian means. 7 The chances for
convergence among the reasonable on such a judgment may, at any
rate, seem substantially better than the chances that a typical, liberal
bill of constitutional rights, as actually construed and applied, can
confidently be pronounced acceptable to everyone who is reasonable
and rational.4" Perhaps, also, the fact that a law was made in
compliance with the requirements of a procedurally majoritarian
constitutional system can itself suffice to render the law legitimate in
the eyes of everyone who is reasonable in a political-liberal sense of
that term.
My use of the term "legitimate," there, carries Waldron's
explorations one step beyond where he, himself, has carried them so
far.49 Yet Waldron does, in effect, ask us to consider the possibility
that my use of the term might be warranted. He wants us to consider
that giving full sway to majority rule may yet prove an apt and
practical way to combine a robust respect for difference, and for the
normatively free and equal status of persons, with a like respect for
the goods of the political5" now expressly understood to encompass
certain communitarian moral goods of social collaboration and
collective action.51 The hypothesis would be that a firm commitment
to majority rule-at least under certain, favorable conditions of
"the
and "self-understanding"5 2 (compare
political culture
reasonable")-can both give us the moral justification we need, as
liberals, for collaboration in enforcement of the resulting laws,
45. See supra Part II.D.
46. See Waldron, supra note 34, at 282-312.
47. See id. at 300-01, 305-06. I have doubted it. See Michelman, "Protectingthe
People From Themselves," or How Direct Can Democracy Be?, supra note 44, at
1728-34. Waldron appreciates the difficulty. See Waldron, supra note 34, at 292-95,
298, 299-300.
48. See Waldron, supra note 34, at 294-95, 306-07; infra Part III.B.
49. See Waldron, supra note 34, at 299-300.
50. See id. at 295-96, 303-05.
51. See id.
[T]he demand that interests me... is a demand for a certain sort of
recognition and ... respect-that this, for the time being, is what the
community has come up with and that it should not be ignored or disparaged
simply because some of us propose, when we can, to repeal it.
Id. at 100 (emphasis omitted).
52. Id. at 308.
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including wrong ones, and, at the same time, carry out the right sort of
respect both for individuality and disagreement and for each other as
political associates and co-operators.5 3
This is a bold venture, and a surprising one coming from as staunch
a defender of liberal rights ideas as Waldron.54 Majority rule has run
into famous objections (which Waldron looks squarely in the eye55) as
a solution to the problem of combining government by law with a
devotion to both individual autonomy and respect for difference. The
slogan "tyranny of the majority" is enough to bring these objections to
mind. In the political-liberal perspective, the question is whether it
could be thought reasonable to call on everyone, as reasonable but
also as rational, to submit their fates to a majoritarian lawmaking
system without also committing our society, from the start, to run
itself in ways designed to constitute and sustain every person as a
competent and respected contributor to political exchange and
contestation and furthermore to social and economic life at large.56 A
negative answer is not prima facie implausible, and it would seem to
be what drives a thinker like Rawls toward his more substantivized
sort of proceduralism. Without trying finally to adjudicate the issue
thus posed between Rawls and Waldron, we can say that a major
question for Waldron is whether the majoritarian principle standing
alone is too "thin" a base on which to rear a political-liberal
legitimation project.57
B. The System as the Set of ConstitutionalEssentials
It seems that the Rawlsian answer must face a converse challenge.
Despite appearances and apparent intentions, the "liberal principle of
legitimacy" may yield too thick a conception of the governmental
system in place to support a political-liberal legitimation project.
Suppose a country has in place a "supreme law"-type of written
constitution containing entrenched recitals of rights against the
government. We might ask what, if anything, that fact about the
country has to do with constructing the "governmental system in
place," whose respect-worthiness might supply the major premise for
a legitimation project. If we were constructing the system the way Ida
does, as an interpreted governmental totality,58 the answer would be
"probably something but by no means everything." As we observed
53. See id. at 302-06.
54. See Jeremy Waldron, Liberal Rights: Collected Papers, 1981-1991 (1993).
55. Waldron, supra note 34, at 298-302.
56. See Frank 1. Michelman, The Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal Political
Justification, 1 Int'l J. Const. L. 13, 22-25 (2003). Waldron agrees. See, e.g., Waldron,
supra note 34, at 284-85.
57. See Michelman, The Problem of Constitutional Interpretive Disagreement,
supra note 20, at 113, 120.
58. See supra Parts I.B, I.C.
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while presenting Ida's way,59 that way involves no necessity to identify
any separate and distinct body of law called "constitutional," and it
makes no necessary demand for an entrenched, supreme-law sort of
constitution containing substantive guarantees. If such a thing does
happen in fact to be there, as a part of a given country's governmental
totality, any Ida's appraisal of the respect-worthiness of that totality
probably will take its presence into account.60 It also will take into
account any judicial rulings issued in its name that currently, as matter
of fact, form a part of the country's governmental system. But if it
happens that no such thing is there, the absence of it neither defeats
appraisal nor points toward a negative appraisal. Historically, they
have not had such a thing in the United Kingdom, and yet affirmative,
legitimacy-sustaining judgments of their governmental totality have
not thereby been rendered unimaginable. Yes, one can argue, as
many recently have done with some degree of success in the U.K., that
it would be on the whole helpful toward that end to introduce the
device of entrenched, supreme, substantive constitutional rights. The
point on which I insist is that one can easily conceive of a respectworthy governmental system without ever having the idea of such a
device enter one's head.61
That is, assuming we are doing it Ida's way. If we are doing it
Rawls' way, the answer is very different. According to Rawls' liberal
principle of legitimacy,62 the project can be carried off only if the
regnant set of constitutional essentials is one that no reasonable
person can reject as unworthy of the kind of respect that the
legitimation project calls for, with the result that no reasonable person
then can complain about the state's demand for everyone's support of
all the laws that make it through the constitutional-legal screen.63 So,
for Rawls, a constitution there must be, in the sense of a distinctly and
separately identifiable body of higher-law norms. That set of
constitutional norms is what supplies the procedure to which
inhabitants resort in order to get some resolution of their expected,
obdurate divisions over the substance of major public policy choices.
It turns out, though, that there are grounds for doubting whether, in a
society where the fact of reasonable pluralism obtains in full force,
any possible constitution could meet the test required by Rawls'
political-liberal procedural principle-i.e., be non-rejectable by
reasonable persons as unworthy of the kind of respect that the

59. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
60. See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 180 (1988). Levinson refers to the
Constitution as a "presence" that may or may not be deemed "encouraging" to "the
establishment of a more perfect Union." Id.
61. See Waldron, supra note 34, at 287-88.
62. See supra text accompanying note 39.
63. At least, that will be true if some limited allowance is made for constrained
events of civil disobedience and conscientious refusal. See supra note 29.
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legitimation project calls for-and still do the work that the project
calls for.
To describe the problem briefly:'
A constitution's substantive
guarantees are cast in abstract formulations, and not by accident, for it
seems they would have to be thus cast in order (this is the
proceduralist move) to prescind from morally divisive, major issues of
public policy. It is not clear, however, that this method of avoidance
can work. One can't, after all, judge a constitutional system in place
respect-worthy (or not) without having in hand an adequate
description of what the system is. Of course, there is a nominal or
textual "Constitution" available for examination at any time. The
question, though, is whether anyone can have in hand an adequate
description of the actual constitutional system-in-place, until that
ever-receding moment arrives when judges and other political actors
finally will have finished the work of resolving reasonable
uncertainties and debates about the textual constitution's bearing on
questions the text may have had to refrain from answering, in order to
achieve a plausible claim to non-rejectability, for legitimation
purposes, by any reasonable political associate. Can I pronounce the
system to have that character in virtue of the nominal constitution's
"equality" clause, without knowing what the system does about
affirmative action? Can I so pronounce it in virtue of the nominal
constitution's "life" clause, without knowing what the system does
about capital punishment? And so on. If not, then it seems that the
respect-worthiness of any constitution, under an adequately complete
description of it, will be subject to the same intractable, reasonable
disagreements over major policy choices that the procedural move is
meant to work around. The set of constitutional essentials, described
with adequate completeness to support the legitimation project, bids
fair to become too thick to secure the agreement-hypothetical,
among the reasonable-that the project requires.
We don't have to decide right here on the ultimate force of this line
of critique of Rawls' proposed, bill-of-rights centered version of a
proceduralized, political-liberal justification of coercive, lawmaking
power. (I, myself, remain uncertain about it). It is enough, for now,
to feel the bite of the critique. That will set us up to ask whether Ida's
way may not be more promising than either Waldron's (too thin?) or
Rawls' (too thick?).
C. Ida's Way: The System as the Rationally Reconstructed
Governmental Totality
If Ida's way does have some advantage over the other two, it is not
because hers is any less "proceduralist" than the others are. Let us be
clear about that. It is Ida's anticipation of deep, obdurate, reasonable
64. I go into it more fully in various papers cited in notes 20 & 44, supra.
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disagreement at the major public policy level that drives her, as a
consensus-seeking political liberal, to her felt need to produce an
account (construction) of the governmental-system-in-place-which,
by being respect-worthy (if it is), can justify support of a government
demanding everyone's compliance with all of its laws.
This
constructed government-in-place plays a proceduralizing role in Ida's
political-liberal thought analogous to that which the set of
constitutional essentials plays in Rawls'.
Inevitably, reasonable disagreement is going to reach its tentacles
into the system-constructions arrived at by sundry Idas all acting in
the best of faith. We can see this by returning to our previous
example.
We left our Lincolnesque, 1857 Ida at odds with the Garrisonians
over which construction of the American Union (long-term slavery
protective, or not) made, at the time, the closer, least-squares fit with
all the relevant data. No doubt, one can imagine Ida's disagreement
with the Garrisonians being strictly a matter of interpretation, not
evaluation. That is, one can imagine the two sides agreeing perfectly
on the weight of the general moral goods of union preservation and
likewise on the lack of preservation-worthiness of a slavery-protective
union, even as they nevertheless disagree over (and only over) how
most accurately to interpret (rationally reconstruct) the specific,
American Union in question. How certain can we be, though-how
certain can the parties be-that the difference in their Unionconstructions is not a direct reflection of a difference in the moral
weights they respectively attach to the moral odiousness of slavery
and the general values of system-preservation? Can their interpretive
disagreement really be guaranteed independent of their respective,
possibly divergent moral "priors?"
It seems there always will be room both for choice among plausible
reconstructions of "the system" and for differing assessments of the
respect-worthiness of the system according to whatever construction is
chosen. It is hard not to suspect that the differing constructions are in
some degree correlated to the differing assessments and that they
both spring directly from differing moral priors regarding the
directions and degrees of moral superiority and inferiority of
particular reconstructions. Any individual social critic's mental and
discursive processes of system-reconstruction undoubtedly are
invaded by moral vectors, and the results arrived at by various critics
undoubtedly are riven by divergence of some of the vectors arising in
their several minds.
A given critic's rationally reconstructed
governmental totality thus seems no likelier than a completely
described set of constitutional essentials (i.e., after the tenors of their
applications to major, divisive public policy questions have been
authoritatively resolved) to figure persuasively as an object of
hypothetical consensus among the reasonable.
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Nevertheless, Ida's way may hold a significant advantage over
Rawls' way. Every Ida who accepts Hobbes' thesis and who attaches
great moral importance to the general goods of union has strong,
moral reasons to wish for a favorable judgment regarding the respectworthiness of the system-in-place as she reconstructs it.
All
reasonable Idas, therefore, have reason to be tolerant of what they see
as moral mishaps in the systemic history-specifically, by writing off
those mishaps as "mistakes." In short, the Idas all may tend to
construe the system, insofar as the facts permit, in ways that to them
are morally optimistic. Since their moral priors will differ, so will the
systemic reconstructions they arrive at. And this is a political-moral
advantage, not a disadvantage! The plurality of the reconstructions
the Idas arrive at will be precisely geared to a convergence across
their number of favorable judgments of respect-worthiness of their
country's political "procedure"-which is exactly what political
liberals are driving at.
Would it be going too far to suggest that we see here quite
graphically what John Rawls had in mind in speaking of the possibility
of an overlapping political-moral consensus among differing,
comprehensive views of morality,' bearing in mind that the goods of
union, or of the political-a perception of which is what all the Idas
share, making
the overlap possible-may well be regarded as moral
66
goods?
It seems-strikingly-that the same hope for an overlapping
consensus cannot be held out, in the same way, for Rawls' own,
constitution-focused liberal principle of legitimacy. That is because
Rawls' proposed principle contains an indissoluble kernel of legalism
and contractualism. That set of "constitutional essentials" upon which
Rawls hypothesizes a possible universal agreement among the
reasonable is a law. It may not be simply a law, or nothing but a law,
but it figures for Rawls as a law however else it also may figure. As a
law, it must have the same applied meaning for everyone. It cannot
mean simultaneously "yes" and "no" to affirmative action. At any
given moment of controversy, it must be held by some Hercules to
mean the one or other, one and the same meaning for you and for me.
In Rawls' principle, in other words, the constitutional essentials serve
as a kind of a political contract-the adequately described terms of
which, one fears, will be either too thick or too thin to carry the
weight of a political-liberal legitimation project.67
No such fear need attach to the governmental totalities the Idas
variously construct. A governmental totality is not a contract that
binds anyone; it is just a picture of an empirically existent social
65.
Papers
66.
67.

See John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, in Rawls: Collected
421 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999); Rawls, supra note 1, at 133-72.
See supra Part II.B.
See Michelman, Living With JudicialSupremacy, supra note 20.
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practice. Although that existent practice-totality is composed, in part,
of laws meant to be binding, no Ida's reconstruction of it has the
binding force of a law. (Ida, to repeat, is not a legal official.68 ) The
existent practice we call the governmental totality is real, no doubt,
and so it is, on some level of possible description, the same for all
participants. But there is no reason why every single participant
cannot or should not perceive it differently and describe it differently
and thereby accommodate the pull each reasonable participant will
feel, for good reason, toward finding it respect-worthy.69 Chartres can
be reported beautiful unanimously, by numerous, competent critics,
all regarding it partially from their several, differing angles of view.
And the case also quite possibly could be that Chartres truly is
beautiful, although no one ever will see it "whole."

68. See supra Part IC, concluding paragraph.
69. See supra Parts I.A, II.C.
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